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DEFERRING CLARITY: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY OF FEDERAL 
OFFICIALS FROM 
SUITS FILED BY AMERICAN CITIZENS ALLEGING TORTURE 
Chelsea Anne Perdue* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has stated that a “state of war is not a blank 
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s 
citizens.”1  In the post-9/11 security chaos, a novel legal issue 
burgeoned into a mass intra-agency debate, as the government began 
detaining persons with little to no evidentiary basis for arrest.2  From 
the heart of this debate sprung a series of conflicting cases in federal 
courts concerning whether American citizens allegedly tortured by the 
U.S. government have a right to sue federal officials for their 
mistreatment.  Legal scholars have paid much attention to the 
presence of a Bivens claim in these cases.3  This Comment analyzes the 
less-discussed, conflicting approaches the federal courts utilize in 
determining whether qualified immunity exempts federal officials 
from suit by American citizens who allege they have been tortured. 
 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Agnes Scott 
College.  I am grateful to Professor Mark Denbeaux for the years of guidance and 
instruction in both scholarly works and life.  Sincerest thanks must extend as well to 
John Badagliacca and the Seton Hall Law Review for their thoughtful edits through this 
Comment.  I am eternally grateful to my family and friends for their kindness and 
patience through the editing and writing process, most notably Thomas and Patsy 
Perdue and Brenda Maddox. 
 1  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004). 
 2  Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 768 (9th Cir. 2012) (“There was at that time 
considerable debate, both in and out of government, over the definition of torture as 
applied to specific interrogation techniques.”). 
 3  A Bivens claim is one in which a plaintiff requests a court imply a cause of action 
against a federal official for constitutional violations.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  For this claim to proceed, a 
court must determine that “(1) Congress has not already provided an exclusive 
statutory remedy; (2) there are no ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence 
of affirmative action by Congress’; and (3) there is no ‘explicit congressional 
declaration’ that money damages not be awarded.”  Hall v. Clinton, 235 F.3d 202, 204 
(4th Cir. 2000) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97). 
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Although few cases have developed, they derive from the post-9/
11 debate on the definition of torture and provide fertile source for 
analysis.  Federal courts have avoided the burden of defining torture 
for future applicants confronted by this situation by dismissing cases 
on the basis of qualified immunity.  Though the scope of this 
Comment’s analysis is limited to thirteen opinions spanning four cases, 
the issue is ripe for decision because federal courts are likely to face 
similar claims in the future of our national security-minded country.  
The federal courts and legislature have deferred to the executive 
branch’s officers over the last five years, passing out qualified immunity 
to officials with valid criminal proceedings against them.  The 
continued cry bemoans that there is no exact precedent on which to 
rely.  This is no surprise given the perpetual grants of qualified 
immunity before cases can be heard on the merits.  The Supreme 
Court, too, has balked at the issue, denying certiorari and dismissing 
these cases.  This Comment’s goal is to take the patches of brilliance 
from thirteen inconsistent and muddied cases and create a working, 
complete legal-analytical framework under which the issue should be 
discussed.  Until the Supreme Court tackles the problem or the lower 
courts agree on the proper or operative analysis, all future cases of 
American citizens against federal officials for violent treatment will be 
doomed before they begin. 
This Comment consists of four overarching components.  Part II, 
provides a brief introduction to the legal foundation of qualified 
immunity, an expansive and complex realm of scholarly development.  
Part III, provides a comprehensive map of the four cases in question.4  
Part IV attempts to sew the scattered pieces of analysis into a 
comprehensive scheme, taking into consideration all collateral 
complications addressed in each opinion.  Finally, Part V concludes, 
encouraging both the judicial and legislative branches to tackle the 
problem of federal officials’ liability for criminal acts without fear of 
the executive branch.  With the segments of qualified immunity 
analysis compiled in a cohesive structure, federal courts can meet the 
needs of American citizens allegedly subjected to maltreatment by 
federal officials. 
 
 4  Every lower court opinion is relevant to this topic because the appellate courts 
are most guilty of shirking the qualified immunity discussion altogether or giving it a 
cursory glance, hastily overturning or affirming the lower courts.  The district courts 
have grappled more thoroughly with the complexities of the qualified immunity issue.  
The facts of the cases are also particularly relevant, considering much of the qualified 
immunity discussion will turn on the specific allegations of each case to determine 
whether there has been a violation of a clearly established right. 
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II.  QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
Qualified immunity is a doctrine that government officials invoke 
to avoid liability when acting within the scope of their discretionary 
function.5  These defendants “generally are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of what a reasonable 
person would have known” at the time of action.6  Liability exists only 
when a violation is “apparent,”7 because government actors “cannot be 
required to predict how the courts will resolve legal issues.”8 
Recently, the standard for qualified immunity analysis has shifted 
from a merits-first requirement to an approach granting increased 
discretion to federal courts.9  The original standard required district 
courts to first determine whether “the facts alleged show the officer’s 
conduct violated a constitutional right.”10  This prompted a discussion 
on the merits of the case, encouraging “the process for the law’s 
elaboration from case to case.”11  Otherwise, courts would be tempted 
to “skip ahead” to the second prong, resulting in a speedier dismissal 
of the case.12  The prior standard dictated that only after finding a 
constitutional violation could the court analyze the second prong: 
“whether the right was clearly established.”13  If a court found that the 
facts alleged showed the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional 
right, and this constitutional right was clearly established at the time of 
the violation, then no qualified immunity would be granted to the 
official.14  The Supreme Court warned that this analysis “must be taken 
 
 5   Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 
794 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 6  Id. 
 7  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
 8  Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 196 (4th Cir. 2009); McVey v. Stacy, 157 
F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 9  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); 
Sarah L. Lochner, Qualified Immunity, Constitutional Stagnation, and the Global War on 
Terror, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 829 (2011).  Lochner analyzes the qualified immunity tests 
implemented by the Supreme Court and concludes that lower federal courts should 
continue to follow the merits-first test articulated in Saucier—especially in the context 
of the Global War on Terror.  Id.  The implementation of the Saucier test by the judge’s 
discretion will serve “not only a notice-giving purpose, but also a constitutional-
updating purpose.”  Id. at 868. 
 10  Katz, 533 U.S. at 201. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
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in the light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 
proposition .  .  .  .”15  The purpose of requiring this analysis is not only 
to determine whether qualified immunity is appropriate in the 
instance, but also to advance legal analysis of the issue.16  Qualified 
immunity is designed to give “government officials breathing room to 
make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal 
questions.”17 
In 2009, the Supreme Court modified the standard, giving lower 
courts discretion to choose which prong of the test to administer first 
and granting courts the ability to dismiss a case on qualified immunity 
without discussing the merits of the case, namely whether a 
constitutional right was violated given the alleged facts.18  This decision 
effectively granted courts the power of exemption from complex and 
controversial issues without having to grapple with the underlying 
merits of the claim and the politically damning facts often 
accompanying it.19  The purpose of the change was to relieve lower 
courts of the burden of expending judicial resources on “an essentially 
academic exercise.”20  The Supreme Court continued, however, to 
encourage lower courts to analyze the constitutional claims before 
reaching the second prong of the test granting dismissal for qualified 
immunity.21 
The doctrine of qualified immunity is far-reaching in both history 
and discussion.  Since its inception, qualified immunity has branched 
into scholarly analyses ranging from Fourth Amendment excessive 
force claims and police misconduct22 to Federal Wiretap Act claims,23 
judge and jury roles,24 and general attempts to explain the intricacies 
 
 15  Id. 
 16  Katz, 533 U.S. at 201. 
 17  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011). 
 18  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. at 237. 
 21  Id. at 236. 
 22  Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity in the Fourth Amendment: A Practical Application of 
§ 1983 As It Applies to Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 21 TOURO L. REV. 571, 
594 (2005); Kathryn R. Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qualified 
Immunity in Section 1983 Actions for A Police Officer’s Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEMP. L. 
REV. 61 (1989); Michael Potere, Note, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: Citizens Recording 
Police Conduct, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 273 (2012); Joann Rene Jenna Roth, Note, Qualified 
Immunity: Private Rights of Action for Constitutional Police Violation Cases in Canada and the 
United States, 4 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 245 (1997). 
 23  Kathleen Lockard, Note, Qualified Immunity as a Defense to Federal Wiretap Act 
Claims, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369 (2001). 
 24  Henk J. Brands, Note, Qualified Immunity and the Allocation of Decision-Making 
Functions Between Judge and Jury, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1045 (1990); Paul D. Watson, 
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of the doctrine.25  The narrow scope of the most recent academic and 
judicial controversy asks when qualified immunity should be granted 
to dismiss cases against federal officials brought by American citizens 
claiming they were tortured and abused in detention.  This controversy 
comes to light in four relevant instances: Lebron v. Rumsfeld,26 Padilla v. 
Yoo,27 Doe v. Rumsfeld,28 and Vance v. Rumsfeld.29 
III.  CASE DISSECTION 
A.  Lebron v.  Rumsfeld30 
1.  Case Facts 
Jose Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested at O’Hare 
International Airport on May 8, 2002 and transferred to New York.31  
By June 9, 2002, President Bush had designated Padilla an enemy 
combatant through a directive to then-Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld.32  Padilla filed a writ of habeas corpus two days later.33  He 
was then transferred to South Carolina where he was denied access to 
counsel and communication with family and underwent “extensive 
interrogation by government officials” until March 2004.34 
 
Qualified Immunity: Should A Judge or Jury Decide Who Prevails in the Battle Between 
Government Efficiency and Constitutional Rights?, 20 STETSON L. REV. 1035 (1991). 
 25  Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229 (2006); 
Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477 
(2011); Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User’s Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187 
(1993); Chaim Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155 (2005); John 
C. Williams, Note, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (2012). 
 26  Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540 (4th 
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th 
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012). 
 27  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 28  Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, No. 1:08-
CV-1902, 2012 WL 3890944 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2012), appeal dismissed, No. 12-5400, 2013 
WL 4711610 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2013). 
 29  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, opinion 
vacated, (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 2796 (2013); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 2796 (2013). 
 30  Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540 (4th 
Cir. 2012); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2751 (2012). 
 31  Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 790.  
 32  Id.  
 33  Id. 
 34  Id. 
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Padilla’s enemy combatant designation was based on reports that 
he was an Al Qaeda operative with possible plans to plant a dirty bomb 
at the capital.35  There were also claims that Padilla discussed placing 
bombs at gas stations, train stations, and hotels.36  Padilla was 
purported to have “significant knowledge” of the plans and personnel 
of Al Qaeda.37 
In the complaint he filed in the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York (“the SDNY”) in 2002,38 Padilla alleged that he was 
a victim of “gross physical and psychological abuse,” mirroring 
treatment designed for Guantanamo Bay detainees.39  This abuse 
included threats of severe physical harm, threats to kill him, sleep 
adjustment, use of stress positions, manacling and shackling for hours 
on end, forced administration of psychotropic drugs, noxious fumes 
causing pain, loud noise, forced grooming, withholding of mattress, 
blankets, sheets, and pillows, shower suspension, constant surveillance 
including while using the toilet and shower, removal of religious items, 
and interference with religious observance.40  The complaint also 
alleged Padilla was denied any contact with the outside world, 
including legal counsel, for twenty-one months.41  In addition, Padilla 
was allegedly denied medical treatment for “serious and potentially 
life-threatening ailments, including chest pain and difficulty 
breathing, as well as for treatment of the chronic, extreme pain caused 
by being forced to endure stress positions.”42 
 
 
 
 
 35  Id. at 798. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 798. 
 38   Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), opinion 
adhered to on reconsideration sub nom. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 
2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 39  Third Amended Complaint ¶ 1, Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787 
(D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012) 
(No. 207CV00410), 2008 WL 4331638. 
 40  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 81.  An example of a threat against 
Padilla includes the threat to cut Padilla with a knife and subsequently pour alcohol 
in the wound. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 81. 
 41  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 82. 
 42  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 101. 
PERDUE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2015  5:45 PM 
2015] COMMENT 221 
2.  Case History 
Padilla filed his claim in the SDNY in 2002.43  Judge and future 
Attorney General Michael Mukasey held that the President had 
inherent authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain citizens as enemy 
combatants.44  He reasoned that Congress’ Joint Resolution implicitly 
authorized this power.45  Nonetheless, Judge Mukasey ordered the 
government to provide Padilla access to legal counsel.46 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding 
that the President does not have the authority to unilaterally designate 
American citizens as enemy combatants and that Congress did not 
implicitly authorize this presidential power.47  On appeal, the Supreme 
Court vacated the district court judgment, arguing that New York did 
not have jurisdiction over the habeas corpus claim, because the 
petition must be filed where the detainee is physically present.48  
Thereafter, Padilla was permitted to file his petition in South 
Carolina.49  The District Court for the District of South Carolina 
ordered Padilla’s release on the grounds the President had no implicit 
authority to designate Padilla an enemy combatant, the cause of his 
indefinite detention.50  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
(“the Fourth Circuit”) reversed, holding that the President had the 
authority to detain Padilla indefinitely as an enemy combatant on 
American soil.51 
Padilla petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court, and days 
before the government had to submit its brief, the government moved 
to vacate the Fourth Circuit’s decision.52  In return, the government 
requested that Padilla be transferred to the Southern District of 
 
 43   Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), opinion 
adhered to on reconsideration sub nom. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 
2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. at 604. 
 47  Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 728–29 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d and remanded, 542 
U.S. 426 (2004). 
 48  Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004). 
 49  Id. 
 50  Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 690 (D.S.C. 2005), rev’d, 423 F.3d 386 (4th 
Cir. 2005). 
 51  Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005) (“The Congress of the United 
States, in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, provided the 
President all powers necessary and appropriate to protect American citizens from 
terrorist acts by those who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001.”). 
 52  Id. at 583. 
PERDUE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2015  5:45 PM 
222 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:215 
Florida to face criminal charges of conspiracy.53  The Fourth Circuit 
denied the motion on the grounds the government was merely 
attempting to evade review by the Supreme Court.54  The Supreme 
Court granted the request to transfer Padilla to civilian authorities in 
Florida based on separation of powers and mootness.55  Padilla’s 
criminal trial commenced in Miami on May 5, 2007.56  The jury 
convicted Padilla on all counts, sentencing him to seventeen years and 
four months in prison.57 
In 2007, Padilla brought a civil suit in the South Carolina District 
Court, alleging his designation as an enemy combatant violated federal 
statutory and constitutional rights.58  The district court dismissed the 
complaint on all counts: the Bivens claim, the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) claim, and the claim of a constitutional 
violation as a result of his designation as an enemy combatant.59  The 
defendants received qualified immunity as to the RFRA and 
constitutional violation arguments.60  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
district court, addressing only the Bivens claim, the RFRA claim, and 
Padilla’s lack of standing in the opinion.61 
3.  Case Description 
At the onset of the action, Padilla named sixty-one defendants.62  
Over time, litigation whittled the number of defendants to seven.63  
These remaining defendants fall into three categories: the then-
 
 53  Id. at 584. 
 54  Id. at 584–87. 
 55  Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006) (“That Padilla’s claims raise fundamental 
issues respecting the separation of powers, including consideration of the role and 
function of the courts, also counsels against addressing those claims when the course 
of legal proceedings has made them, at least for now, hypothetical.”). 
 56  Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 794 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540 
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012). 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. at 800, 805.   
 60  Id. 
 61  Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 556, 560–61 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 2751 (2012). 
 62  Id. at 546. 
 63  Id.  Initial defendants include “Legal Professional Defendants” accused of 
“formulating the program of confinement and interrogation” and interfering with 
Padilla’s right to counsel.  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 28.  Initial 
defendants also consisted of “Medical Professional Defendants” who monitored 
Padilla’s medical state during interrogation and covered their nametags to avoid 
identification.  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶¶ 29–30.  Additionally, 
unidentified “Interrogator Defendants” and “Guard Defendants” were named at the 
onset of litigation.  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶¶ 31–32. 
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Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, the former Naval Consolidated 
Brig Commanders, and high-ranking officials involved with 
policymaking.64  Padilla sued Panetta in both his individual and official 
capacities, seeking declaratory relief and an injunction against 
designation as an enemy combatant.65  Catherine Haft and Melanie 
Marr, former Naval Consolidated Brig Commanders, allegedly 
“implemented the unlawful regime devised and authorized by Senior 
Defense Policy Defendants.”66  In addition, Padilla asserted that former 
Defense Department General Counsel William Haynes, former 
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Vice Admiral Lowell E. 
Jacoby, former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, and former 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz exhibited “extreme 
indifference to an obvious risk of serious harm” to Padilla, “conspired 
to bring about a regime of extreme and unlawful detention and 
interrogation” of enemy combatants, and “permitted the application 
of those unlawful policies” to U.S. citizens on U.S. soil.67 
The district court found that qualified immunity applied to all 
defendants named in the action in all counts regarding designation 
and detention as an enemy combatant.68  The court engaged in a two-
part analysis of the qualified immunity question.69  First, the court 
determined that Padilla’s designation as an enemy combatant did not 
violate any “clearly established Constitutional rights.”70  Considering 
the case history, Judge Gergel determined that the “strikingly varying 
judicial decisions appear to be the very definition of unsettled law.”71  
Second, the court determined Padilla’s detention and designation as 
an enemy combatant did not violate any “clearly established” federal 
law: “To say the scope and nature of Padilla’s legal rights at that time 
were unsettled would be an understatement.”72  The court reasoned 
that the Department of Justice “officially sanctioned” the techniques 
implemented against Padilla.73  Additionally, the Department of 
Defense declared the government’s actions lawful.74  Demonstrating 
 
 64  Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d at 546–47. 
 65  Id. at 547. 
 66  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 7. 
 67  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 5. 
 68  Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 805 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540 
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012). 
 69  Id. at 803–04.  
 70  Id. at 803. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. at 803–04. 
 73  Id. at 803. 
 74  Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 803. 
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the lack of unanimity on the issue, the FBI and General Counsel of the 
Navy advised that the methods violated both American law and the 
Geneva Convention.75  To compound conflicting opinions, “[n]o court 
had specifically and definitively addressed the rights of enemy 
combatants.”76 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for 
all defendants.77  They did not, however, address the qualified 
immunity claim deriving from Padilla’s treatment and designation as 
an enemy combatant.78  Instead, they based the affirmation on the 
collateral Bivens claim,79 qualified immunity from the RFRA claim,80 
and a lack of standing.81  The United States Supreme Court denied the 
petition for writ of certiorari.82 
B.  Padilla v. Yoo83 
1.  Parties and Arguments 
The facts of Padilla v. Yoo mirror those of Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 
discussed above.  John Yoo, President Bush’s Deputy Attorney General 
in the Office of Legal Counsel at the time of Padilla’s designation as 
an enemy combatant, was the defendant named in this action.84  
Padilla’s complaint in this action alleged that Yoo was the “de facto 
head of war-on-terrorism legal issues,” considering the promulgation 
of his legal memoranda,85 and that he “shaped government policy in 
his role as key member of a small, secretive, and highly influential 
group of senior administration officials known as the ‘War Council,’ 
which met regularly ‘to develop policy in the war on terrorism.’”86 
 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 562 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2751 (2012). 
 78  Id. at 556 (“Because we conclude that Padilla’s Bivens action cannot be 
maintained, we need not reach the questions of whether the defendants are entitled 
to qualified immunity or whether Padilla has pleaded his claim with adequate 
specificity.”). 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. at 560. 
 81  Id. at 561–62. 
 82  Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012). 
 83  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 84  Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1030, 1014. 
 85  First Amended Complaint ¶ 19, Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 
2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 08-cv-00035-JSW), 2008 WL 2433172. 
 86  First Amended Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 15 (citing JOHN YOO, WAR BY 
OTHER MEANS (Atlantic Monthly Press 2006)). 
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The complaint sought a “judgment declaring that the acts alleged 
[t]herein [were] unlawful and violate[d] the Constitution and laws of 
the United States” and sought “[d]amages in the amount of one 
dollar.”87  Padilla leveled tripartite arguments against Yoo.88  First, that 
Yoo was personally involved in the decision to designate Padilla an 
enemy combatant in violation of U.S. law, because he personally 
reviewed the reports on Padilla.89  Second, the policies Yoo prepared 
approved of the “decision to employ unlawfully harsh interrogation 
tactics”90 which “proximately and foreseeably led to the abuses 
suffered.”91  Finally, Yoo abused the power of his position as a lawyer by 
drafting memos with the intent to shape government policy designed 
to immunize officials and “evade all legal constraints.”92  Additionally, 
Padilla alleged violations of the following constitutional and statutory 
rights: denial of access to counsel, denial of access to court, 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, unconstitutional 
interrogations, denial of freedom of religion, denial of the right of 
information, denial of the right to association, unconstitutional 
military detention, denial of the right to be free from unreasonable 
seizures, and denial of due process.93 
Defendant Yoo moved for dismissal of the action for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.94  Yoo advanced three 
arguments that Padilla failed to state a claim for money damages.95  
First, Yoo argued that the Bivens rule creating a private cause of action 
against federal officials in some circumstances did not apply.96  Second, 
he argued that qualified immunity should be granted because 
“Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Defendant Yoo personally 
participated in any violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”97  
Finally, Yoo contended that qualified immunity should be granted 
because “Plaintiffs have not alleged a violation of any constitutional 
 
 87  First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, ¶¶ 15, 19, 36, 38, 46. 
 88  First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, ¶ 84. 
 89  First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, ¶¶ 37, 38. 
 90  First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, ¶ 27. 
 91  First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, ¶ 46. 
 92  First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, ¶¶ 3, 15. 
 93  First Amended Complaint, supra note 85. 
 94  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
 95  Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 96  Defendant John Yoo’s Motion to Dismiss at 12–23, Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 
2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. C 08-00035 JSW), 
2008 WL 941436 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). 
 97  Defendant John Yoo’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 96, at 26. 
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rights.”98 
2.  Case Description 
The district court ruled in Padilla’s favor on both issues collateral 
to qualified immunity: the Bivens claim and the RFRA claim.99  The 
court of appeals forwent discussion of Bivens and “resolve[d] all claims 
under qualified immunity.”100 
The district court held that Yoo was not entitled to qualified 
immunity from suit.101  The court separated the analysis into two parts: 
whether there was a claim stated for violation of constitutional rights 
and whether basic constitutional protections were clearly 
established.102  Yoo argued that he was not personally responsible for 
any violation of Padilla’s constitutional rights.103  The district court 
rebutted Yoo’s arguments by finding a causal link between Yoo’s 
actions and the constitutional violations allegedly suffered.104  To find 
causation, “direct personal participation” was not required.105  The 
court noted that an alternative causal link could be established if the 
actor “set[s] in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows 
or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the 
constitutional injury.”106  The court found that several actions Yoo took 
were critical in creating a causal link between the defendant and the 
constitutional violation.107  The court held that Yoo “participated 
directly in developing policy on the war on terror” by drafting 
memoranda laying the “legal groundwork” for designation of persons 
as enemy combatants.108  He also “personally reviewed” the compiled 
documents assessing Padilla’s detention and wrote a legal opinion 
 
 98  Defendant John Yoo’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 96, at 32. 
 99  Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1030, 1039. 
 100  Yoo, 678 F.3d at 757. 
 101  Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1038. 
 102  Id. at 1032, 1036. 
 103  Id. at 1032.  There are four main arguments to support Yoo’s claim.  Id.  First, 
that Yoo’s memoranda were just a fragment of the “complex mechanism employed by 
the President” that led to Padilla’s designation as an enemy combatant.  Id.  Second, 
the legal memoranda explicitly state, “Yoo was not expressing any view on the policy 
decisions” of the President.  Id.  Third, the memoranda (with only one exception) 
were designed to apply to those captured outside of the United States.  Id.  Finally, 
there are no facts that link Yoo with any specific treatment allegedly suffered.  Id. 
 104  Id. at 1034. 
 105  Id. at 1032–33 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743–44 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
 106  Yoo, 633 F. Supp 2d at 1032–33.  
 107  Id. at 1033–34. 
 108  Id. at 1033. 
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based on the review.109  Attorney General Ashcroft relied on Yoo’s legal 
opinion when recommending to the President that Padilla be 
detained.110  Yoo specifically advised federal officials that “military 
detention of an American citizen seized on American soil was lawful” 
because the “Fourth Amendment had no application to domestic 
military operations in [that] context.”111  Additionally, after a War 
Council meeting concerning the legal justification of interrogation 
techniques including waterboarding and mock burials, Yoo 
promulgated a renowned memorandum defining torture as causing 
pain “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical 
injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even 
death.”112 
Given Yoo’s approval of these techniques and his knowledge of 
Padilla’s detention, the court held that it was foreseeable these 
techniques—alleged to violate constitutional rights—would be 
inflicted on Padilla as a direct result of Yoo’s actions.113  The district 
court found a violation of the constitutional right to access courts114 
and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.115  On the other hand, the court found no violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.116  Finally, the district court concluded its analysis 
by holding that the constitutional rights afforded Padilla were clearly 
established at the time of the violation.117 
 
 
 
 109  Id. (citing JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS (Atlantic Monthly Press 
2006)). 
 110  Yoo, 633 F. Supp 2d at 1033. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. at 1033–34.  Jay Bybee and John Yoo composed the infamous memorandum, 
commonly referred to as one of the Torture Memos.  Along with the definition of 
torture that sparked a nationwide scholastic response, the memoranda advised the 
executive branch that the Geneva Convention did not apply to detainees captured in 
the war on terror.  JAY BYBEE, MEMORANDUM FOR ALBERTO R. GONZALES, 
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR 
INTERROGATION UNDER 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A 1 (2002), available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70964/00355_020801_001display.pdf; 
JOHN YOO AND ROBERT J. DELAHUNTY, MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM J. HAYNES II, 
GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, RE: APPLICATION OF 
TREATIES AND LAWS TO AL QUAEDA AND TALIBAN DETAINEES (2002), 
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf. 
 113  Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. 
 114  Id. at 1035. 
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. at 1036. 
 117  Id. at 1039. 
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This analysis mirrored that of the court when evaluating the 
substantive constitutional rights of Padilla.118  The district court first 
noted that the facts of the complaint “clearly violate the rights afforded 
to citizens held in the prison context.”119  Then, the court declared 
“unpersuasive” the defendant’s argument that there is no precedent 
for affording such a high level of constitutional rights to American 
enemy combatants detained on American soil.120  The court reasoned 
that as long as authority indicated that “‘the disputed right existed, 
even if no case had specifically so declared,’ the Defendants would be 
on notice of the right.”121  In this case, there was notice because “federal 
officials were cognizant of the basic fundamental civil rights afforded 
to detainees under the United States Constitution.”122 
After the defendants’ appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
(“the Ninth Circuit”) held Yoo was entitled to qualified immunity, 
because at the time of Padilla’s detention, American citizens had no 
clearly established right protecting them from the treatment Padilla 
underwent.123  In addition, the court reasoned Yoo was not on notice 
that his conduct violated the law.124  Although the treatment 
“appear[ed] to have been a violation of his constitutional rights” as 
prohibited by the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,125 the court of 
appeals found Hamdi inapplicable.126  Additionally, the court of appeals 
 
 118  Id. at 1036. 
 119  Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1036. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. at 1036–37 (citing Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir.2007)); see 
infra Part IV.B.3.ii. 
 122  Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1037.  The court argues that Supreme Court precedent 
would have afforded a federal official such as Yoo notice that his actions violated 
Padilla’s constitutional rights.  Id.  The first opinion referenced holds that denial of 
medicine can constitute suffering “inconsistent with contemporary standards of 
decency as manifested in modern legislation” that requires care for prisoners.  Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976).  In addition, the district court considers the 
Supreme Court holding that “persons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals 
whose conditions are designed to punish.”  Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–
22 (1982). 
 123  Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 748, 761, 768 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 124  Id. at 768. 
 125  Id. at 761. 
 126  Id. The court of appeals’ reasoning in finding Hamdi inapplicable centered 
around three arguments.  Id.  First, that Hamdi was decided in 2004, after Yoo’s alleged 
actions spanning his years in office from 2001 to 2003.  Id.  Consequently, Yoo had no 
notice of the holding in Hamdi applicable to enemy combatants.  Yoo, 678 F.3d at 761.  
Second, “it remain[ed] murky” whether enemy combatants were afforded the same 
protection from constitutional violations that prisoners were.  Id.  Finally, the court of 
appeals reasoned that although Hamdi extended the protection of due process to 
enemy combatants, the Supreme Court suggested the rights may not parallel those 
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held that in light of Supreme Court precedent found in Ex parte Quirin, 
a federal official “could have had some reason to believe that Padilla’s 
harsh treatment fell within constitutional bounds.”127 
Although the court mentioned that Padilla’s detention “could 
have been helpful to the United States in staving off further terrorist 
attacks,” it renounced the sentiment by a hasty claim: “We express no 
opinion as to whether those allegations were true, or whether, even if 
true, they justified the extreme conditions of confinement to which 
Padilla says he was subjected.”128  The court maintained that Padilla was 
not “just another detainee,” and it was not reasonably apparent that 
Padilla was entitled to the constitutional safeguards of an accused 
criminal or prisoner.129 
The Ninth Circuit also held that although “officials can still be on 
notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual 
circumstances,” that was not the case in this instance.130  Although 
torture of American citizens is unconstitutional “beyond debate,”131 the 
issue of whether, from 2001 to 2003, the actions leveled against Padilla, 
“however appalling,” were torture was subject to debate.132 
 
 
granted to other kinds of detainees.  Id.  Since the Supreme Court in Hamdi stated that 
enemy combatants’ rights “may be tailored” to each circumstance, the government 
had flexibility in bestowing rights.  Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 
(2004)). 
 127  Yoo, 678 F.3d at 762.  Ex parte Quirin involved a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy 
combatant and tried by a military commission.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24 (1942), 
modified sub nom. U.S. ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 63 S. Ct. 22 (1942).  The Supreme Court 
held the detainee was not entitled to a trial by jury and grand jury presentment in light 
of the historic practice of trying enemy combatants in military court.  Id. at 38–44.  The 
detainee’s American citizenship was immaterial.  Id. at 37–38, 44–45.  
 128  Yoo, 678 F.3d at 762.  The court briefly references Supreme Court precedent 
describing “[i]ncommunicado detention for months on end” as an “unlawful 
procedure[ ] to extract information.”  Id. (citing Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 
(2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).  An exaggerated 
illustration of the application of the rule would be that welfare officials are not 
statutorily prohibited from selling children into slavery, but that does not mean they 
would be immune should they do so.  K.H. Through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 
851 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 131  Yoo, 678 F.3d at 763. 
 132  Id. at 767–68.  
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C.  Doe v.  Rumsfeld133 
1.  Case Facts 
Plaintiff, John Doe, worked for a defense contractor in Iraq as a 
translator after retiring from the United States Army.134  Doe worked 
for the United States Marine Corps Human Exploitation Team, 
successfully obtaining Iraqi Sheikh Abd Al-Sattar Abu Risha’s Sheikh’s 
support on behalf of the United States.135  While Doe was preparing for 
annual leave scheduled for November 5, 2005, the Navy Criminal 
Investigative Service questioned Doe for several hours after 
transporting him to an airbase in Anbar.136  Doe refused to answer any 
questions after being denied an attorney.137  Consequently, he was 
blindfolded, kicked, and an officer threatened to shoot Doe should he 
attempt escape.138  Doe’s questioners then flew him thirty minutes away 
and placed him in the custody of the Marine Corps, who promptly 
strip-searched Doe and placed him in isolation.139  After seventy-two 
hours of isolation, Doe was once more hooded and transported to 
Camp Cropper, a military facility for “high value” detainees near 
Baghdad.140  Doe spent three months in isolation before being moved 
to cell housing with alleged Al Qaeda members.141  Doe’s military 
affiliation was publicized to the inmates and, as a result, he was 
attacked on multiple occasions.142  The complaint states that Doe “lived 
in constant fear for his life.”143  During this time, the guards also 
assaulted and choked Doe.144  In addition, the guards subjected Doe to 
psychological duress, preventing Doe from sleeping by keeping the 
lights on, playing heavy metal music at “intolerably loud volumes,” and 
banging on the cell door when Doe appeared to be sleeping.145 
 
 133  Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, No. 12-
5400, 2013 WL 4711610 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2013).  
 134  Complaint at ¶ 4, Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 
F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 1:08-cv-01902), 2008 WL 7182131. 
 135  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 4. 
 136  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 56. 
 137  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 60. 
 138  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 65, 66. 
 139  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 67, 68. 
 140  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 73. 
 141  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 83, 84. 
 142  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 86. 
 143  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 89. 
 144  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 82. 
 145  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 78. 
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Doe’s first status hearing took place on December 22, 2005.146  The 
hearing’s purpose was to determine whether Doe should retain his 
designation as “security internee,” be released as an “innocent 
civilian,” or further detained as an “enemy combatant.”147  Doe’s 
requests for an attorney or a member of his team to serve as a witness 
were denied, and his custodians told him that the only evidence he 
could present was evidence “reasonably available” to him in the 
camp.148  During the hearing, Doe could not view evidence against him, 
hear testimony, or cross-examine testimony brought against him.149  
After a “very short” hearing, the Status Board determined Doe was a 
threat and authorized his continued detention.150  Doe spent the next 
six months in captivity before receiving notice of a second Status 
Hearing in July 2006.151  Once again, his custodians denied his requests 
for an attorney, limited his presentation of evidence to that 
“reasonably available” to him at Camp Cropper, and denied the ability 
to present evidence from the Human Exploitation Team.152  This 
hearing lasted “much longer than the first” and included inquiry into 
Doe’s treatment and “what he would do if he were released from the 
Camp.”153  Doe was finally released in August 2006 after being 
blindfolded and told he was being transferred.154 
2.  Case Description 
The district court began its analysis by establishing that Doe had 
no implied or express private right of action under the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005.155  In addition, the court dismissed without 
prejudice Doe’s allegation of denial of the right to travel, with the 
opportunity to amend his complaint upon remand.156  The 
government’s motion for a more definite statement in regards to Doe’s 
allegation of interference with his right to travel was denied.157  Also, 
the court held there were “no special factors to preclude a Bivens 
 
 146  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 99. 
 147  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 96. 
 148  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 97, 98. 
 149  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 100. 
 150  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 101. 
 151  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 102, 103. 
 152  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 104. 
 153  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 106. 
 154  Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 116–18. 
 155  Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 104 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 
(D.C. Cir. 2012).  
 156  Id. at 125. 
 157  Id. at 126. 
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remedy for Doe’s alleged constitutional claims, and because there were 
no alternative remedies available for the due process violations of 
which Doe complained, the court concluded that Doe could assert a 
cause of action under Bivens.”158 
The district court divided its analysis of qualified immunity into 
three parts: (1) substantive due process,159 (2) procedural due 
process,160 and (3) access to courts.161  The court led the discussion with 
causation, because liability under Bivens relies on the perpetrator 
being “personally involved in the illegal conduct.”162  Under this 
heading, the court immediately dismissed Doe’s procedural due 
process and access to court claims.163  The decision on both counts 
centered on the flawed argument that because Rumsfeld “had final say 
over the continued detention or release of detainees,” he inferentially 
had control over the procedural rights of detainees.164 
The court found, however, that Doe’s complaint pleaded facts 
sufficient to allege Rumsfeld’s personal involvement in the alleged 
breach of substantive due process rights.165  Doe established causation 
through specific instances of Rumsfeld’s approval of interrogation 
techniques, continued involvement in modifying and enhancing 
interrogation techniques, and through Rumsfeld’s dispatch of Major 
General Miller, in charge of Guantanamo Bay at the time, to the camp 
Doe was held at with instructions to “gitmo-ize” it.166 
The district court then went through the test for qualified 
immunity, determining first that “Doe had a constitutional right to be 
free from conduct and conditions of confinement that shock the 
conscience.”167  It reasoned “that such right was clearly established at 
 
 158  Id. at 111. 
 159  Id. at 115–21. 
 160  Id. at 121. 
 161  Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 121. 
 162  Simpkins v. D.C. Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 163  Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 114, 115. 
 164  Id. at 114.  The quote derives from the analysis of the procedural due process 
portion of the opinion.  Id.  In the section on the access to courts, the district court 
similarly stated that Doe alleged that “Rumsfeld controlled the decision to release 
detainees.”  Id. at 115. 
 165  Id. at 114 (“At this early stage of proceedings in this case, Doe’s allegations 
sufficiently support his claim that Rumsfeld was involved in the substantive due process 
violations related to the conditions of confinement and interrogation at Camp 
Cropper.  He has alleged with adequate specificity that Rumsfeld knew of, ordered, 
and approved the alleged constitutionally deficient interrogation methods and 
detention conditions employed in Iraq.”). 
 166  Id. at 113–14.  
 167  Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 115. 
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the time of Rumsfeld’s conduct,” and finally “that Doe ha[d] pleaded 
factual allegations sufficient to support a claim that Rumsfeld’s 
conduct violated this clearly-established right.”168  Rumsfeld’s qualified 
immunity defense failed in regards to the substantive due process 
violations.169  Constitutional violation turned on the district court’s 
decision to “consider[] the cumulative impact” of the constitutional 
violations alleged.170  The court considered two proposed theories of 
liability, intent to injure and deliberate indifference, and held that Doe 
satisfied both.171  Doe sufficiently alleged that Rumsfeld’s intent to 
harm rose to a “conscience-shocking level” on the grounds that 
Rumsfeld merely asserted there was a legitimate government interest 
in Doe’s detention without evidentiary support.172  The court 
additionally reasoned that the question should be taken up at a later 
“stage of litigation when the Court can properly consider such 
evidence.”173  The district court also held that Doe’s complaint 
sufficiently alleged Rumsfeld’s deliberate indifference to Doe’s 
substantive due process rights.174  Though Rumsfeld argued these 
actions intended to “restore order or security” in the “dangerous and 
volatile conditions in Iraq,” the court dismissed those arguments on 
the ground there was no evidence Doe’s detention was an attempt to 
“quell violence or restore order within Camp Cropper.”175 
Finally, the court faced Rumsfeld’s claim that the violated 
constitutional rights were not clearly established at the time to the 
extent that no reasonable official in Rumsfeld’s position would have 
known the conduct was unconstitutional.176  The district court 
dismissed Rumsfeld’s contentions on the grounds the constitutional 
rights of American citizens abroad were clearly established at the time 
of the violation.177  In addition, the court reasoned that judicial 
precedent established the rights of pretrial detainees.178  The court 
 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. at 116. 
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. at 116–17 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)).  
 173  Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 117. 
 174  Id. at 119. 
 175  Id. at 118. 
 176  Id. at 119.  Rumsfeld’s claim is grounded on the contention that no court had 
held that an American citizen possessed constitutional rights on a foreign battlefield 
when detained by the American military.  Id. at 120. 
 177  Id. at 119. 
 178  Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 119.  The Court referenced a Supreme Court 
opinion holding that “pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, 
retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted 
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explained that there is nothing distinctive about the camp at which 
Doe was held to justify an exemption to his clearly established 
constitutional rights abroad.179  Also, the shock the conscience 
standard and its legal foundation in relation to both unconstitutional 
conduct and conditions of confinement were clearly established at the 
time of the alleged violations.180  The district court’s thorough analysis 
led to the final holding that Rumsfeld was not entitled to qualified 
immunity, because a reasonable official in his position would have 
known the actions violated the Constitution.181 
The court of appeals, finding that there was no Bivens remedy 
available to Doe, forewent an analysis of Rumsfeld’s qualified 
immunity defense.182  On remand, the district court only dealt with the 
claim of interference with the right to travel, where it “reluctantly” held 
in the defendants’ favor.183  Adding finality to the case, the court of 
appeals dismissed Doe’s appeal in July 2013.184 
D.  Vance v.  Rumsfeld185 
1.  Case Facts 
Two American citizens, Donald Vance and Nathan Ertel, alleged 
that in 2006, they were detained unlawfully in a military compound in 
Iraq and subjected to interrogations via “physically and mentally 
 
prisoners.”  Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)). 
 179  Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 120. 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. at 121. 
 182  Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 397 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Because we have 
determined that Doe may not bring a Bivens action against Secretary Rumsfeld, we 
need not consider Secretary Rumsfeld’s qualified immunity defense to such an 
action.”). 
 183  Doe v. Rumsfeld, No. 1:08-CV-1902, 2012 WL 3890944 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2012), 
appeal dismissed, No. 12-5400, 2013 WL 4711610 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2013).  In this brief 
opinion, the district court blatantly expressed sympathy for Doe and reluctance to find 
in favor of the defendants.  Id.  The court indicated exasperation with both the attitude 
of the government and the lack of resources available to Doe.  Id.  They asserted that 
Doe “might have accepted an apology from our government, had it ever offered one.  
But it didn’t.”  Id.  They were compelled to rule in favor of defendants “in spite of 
Doe’s appalling (and, candidly, embarrassing) allegations” and urged him to “consider 
the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, through 
which, for better or worse, he can get ‘final agency action.’”  Id.  
 184  Doe v. Rumsfeld, No. 12-5400, 2013 WL 4711610 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2013).  
 185  Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 06 C 6964, 2009 WL 2252258 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2009), 
rev’d, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 
701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated, (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013). 
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coercive tactics . . . reserved for terrorists.”186  Vance, a Navy veteran, 
and Ertel, a government contracting employee, acted as employees of 
a military contractor in Iraq, Shield Security Group (“SGS”).187  
Plaintiffs witnessed other agents pay Iraqi leaders, and they suspected 
illegal activities were taking place.188  Vance reported the activity to the 
FBI regularly, eventually uncovering evidence of the group’s 
protection of enemy Iraqi arms dealers and leaders.189  In addition, the 
“[p]laintiffs came to learn that SGS . . . was amassing and selling 
weapons for profit.”190 
Ertel resigned on April 1, 2009, and the next day he and Vance 
were denied access to move freely around the compound: “They were 
trapped.”191  Military personnel came to seize them and their 
belongings containing the evidence gathered against SGS, including 
laptops, cameras, and cell phones.192  Plaintiffs were classified “security 
internees,” enabling interrogators to “detain Plaintiffs indefinitely 
without due process or access to an attorney.”193 
Once transferred to Camp Prosperity, plaintiffs were strip-
searched and placed in a cage before being transferred to 24-hour 
solitary confinement.194  After a short stay at Camp Prosperity, they 
spent the remainder of their detention in solitary confinement at 
Camp Cropper, Baghdad.195  Feces lined the walls of their cells, which 
were kept “extremely cold” with the lights perpetually left on.196  The 
prison attempted to deprive detainees of all sleep by blasting heavy 
metal music and banging on the cell doors when guards noticed a 
prisoner nodding off.197  Plaintiffs were repeatedly denied water, food, 
clothing, and medical care.198  In addition, “guards would also torment 
 
 186  Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1–3, Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 06 C 6964, 2009 WL 
2252258 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2009), rev’d, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 
701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 06 C 6964), 2007 
WL 928914. 
 187  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 30, 32, 41, 44–45. 
 188  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 49–50. 
 189  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 51–53, 67, 71–72, 79–81, 87–89, 96, 
101, 105. 
 190  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 111. 
 191  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 124, 127–28, 130. 
 192  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 138–39. 
 193  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 145. 
 194  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 152, 154.  Plaintiffs were permitted to 
use the bathroom twice per day and slept on a thin mat over concrete.  Amended 
Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 154. 
 195  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 157. 
 196  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 159–60. 
 197  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 162. 
 198  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 163–166.  After a tooth of Ertel’s 
PERDUE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2015  5:45 PM 
236 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:215 
Plaintiffs, apparently trying to keep them off-balance mentally.”199  
They were continually subjected to assault and threats of further 
assault.200  Plaintiffs were denied phone calls, access to counsel, and 
requests for clergy multiple times.201  During this time, they were 
regularly interrogated on non sequitur topics, one of which concerned 
what they planned to do if they were released and whether they would 
pursue legal action or write a book.202 
Around April 20, 2006, the plaintiffs received a letter from the 
Detainee Status Board stating a hearing regarding their status would 
be held April 23, 2006 at the earliest.203  The letter stated that they 
would not be provided access to counsel and could present only 
evidence “reasonably available” to them from prison at Camp 
Cropper.204  Each plaintiff requested his laptop and cell phone to prove 
he was providing intelligence to the American government regarding 
SGS’s illegal activities.205  This evidence was withheld.206  Plaintiffs were 
denied their requests to have others present and could not review or 
hear evidence against them.207  In the meantime, “neither Mr. Vance’s 
nor Mr. Ertel’s family or friends knew of their detention despite 
vigorous efforts to contact United States officials to determine the 
Plaintiffs’ whereabouts.”208 
Ertel was classified an innocent civilian on May 17, 2006, one 
month after the Detainee Status Board had his hearing.209  He was not 
released for another 18 days.210  Vance was detained an additional two 
months, and was not declared an innocent civilian until July 20, 2006.211  
At this time, he was dropped at the Baghdad International Airport to 
“fend for himself without the documentation needed to return to the 
 
became infected from denial of basic medical care, he had it hurriedly yanked out.  
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 166.  Afterwards, guards confiscated all 
antibiotics and painkillers, so the hole became infected and filled with puss.  Amended 
Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 167.  No further medical care was administered for it.  
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 167. 
 199  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 169. 
 200  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 170–71. 
 201  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 175–77, 179. 
 202  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 178–89. 
 203  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 190–91. 
 204  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 190–91. 
 205  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 194. 
 206  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 195. 
 207  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 200–01. 
 208  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 204. 
 209  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 208. 
 210  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 209. 
 211  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 210–11. 
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United States.”212  In total, Ertel was held in solitary confinement and 
interrogated for forty days, and Vance was held for nearly one hundred 
days without any criminal charges against them.213 
Plaintiffs brought suit against Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in 
his individual capacity, the unidentified individual defendants who 
subjected them to interrogations, and the United States for the return 
of their personal property.214 
2.  Case History 
In 2009, a district court ruled only on the seizure of property 
question, holding that the plaintiffs properly pleaded and survived a 
motion to dismiss.215  Simultaneously, there was an action pending in 
the district court addressing the claims of cruel and inhumane 
treatment, requiring analysis of a Bivens cause of action, qualified 
immunity, procedural due process, and denial of access to courts.216  
Although this court dismissed the plaintiffs’ counts alleging 
procedural due process217 and denial of access to courts,218 it held the 
plaintiffs presented a cause of action under Bivens219 and that Rumsfeld 
was not entitled to qualified immunity.220 
Rumsfeld’s personal involvement in the inhumane treatment, 
and thus causation, was established using evidence identical to that 
presented by the plaintiff in Doe v. Rumsfeld.221  The court next moved 
to the initial stage of the qualified immunity test of whether plaintiffs’ 
treatment violated a constitutional right.222  The court concluded the 
 
 212  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 211. 
 213  Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 213. 
 214  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 598 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013). 
 215  Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 06 C 6964, 2009 WL 2252258 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2009), 
rev’d, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 
701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 216  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 961, 975, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 
F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d 
193 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 217  Id. at 977. 
 218  Id. at 978. 
 219  Id. at 975. 
 220  Id. at 971. 
 221  Id. at 962–64.  Evidence includes Rumsfeld’s approval of enhanced 
interrogation techniques, continued research into interrogation with the Working 
Group, and assignment of MG Miller of Guantanamo Bay to the camp to “gitmo-ize” 
it.  Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 113–14 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 222  Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 966. 
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conditions alleged were sufficient to lead a court to “plausibly 
determine that the conditions of confinement were torturous.”223  
Finally, the district court found the final part of the qualified immunity 
test, whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time 
of the violation, favored the plaintiffs.224  The district court found most 
persuasive plaintiffs’ argument that the Constitution applies to 
American citizens in full force whether inside or outside the nation’s 
borders: “[T]he right of American citizens to be free from torture is a 
well-established part of our constitutional fabric . . . .”225  In addition, 
though Rumsfeld’s position was not “uncomplicated by the pulls of 
competing obligations,” he had ample “opportunity to reflect on the 
material and constitutional consequences of his alleged actions.”226  
The district court claimed that the holding does not second-guess 
military officials, but instead “represents a recognition that federal 
officials may not strip citizens of well-settled constitutional protections 
against mistreatment simply because they are located in a tumultuous 
foreign setting.”227 
Though the court of appeals reversed the earlier decision to 
permit the plaintiffs’ claim for personal property to continue,228 it 
affirmed the district court’s holding for the plaintiffs in regards to 
finding personal involvement of Rumsfeld in the abuse,229 Rumsfeld’s 
lack of qualified immunity,230 and the plaintiffs’ cause of action under 
Bivens.231  The court of appeals launched into its analysis of qualified 
immunity, finding there “can be no doubt” that the alleged treatment 
violated constitutional rights of Americans, “even in a war zone.”232  
Addressing defendants’ claims that the allegations were “vague, 
cursory, and conclusory,” the court of appeals listed specific examples 
 
 223  Id. at 967. 
 224  Id. at 971. 
 225  Id. at 969–70.  
 226  Id. at 971 (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998)). 
 227  Id. 
 228  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 627 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013). 
 229  Id. at 603.  Note the slight disparity in conclusions between the district court 
and court of appeals.  The court of appeals found “the plaintiffs’ pleadings, if true, 
have sufficiently alleged not only Secretary Rumsfeld’s personal responsibility in 
creating the policies that led to the plaintiffs’ treatment but also deliberate 
indifference by Secretary Rumsfeld in failing to act to stop the torture of these 
detainees despite actual knowledge of reports of detainee abuse.”  Id. at 600.  
 230  Id. at 611. 
 231  Id. at 626. 
 232  Id. at 606–07. 
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of the defendants’ standard for pleading being too demanding.233  
Next, the court extended the protections of the Eighth Amendment 
beyond convicted prisoners and to pretrial detainees.234  It analogized 
the conditions of Vance’s treatment to the permitted treatment of 
convicted prisoners and concluded it “would have no trouble 
acknowledging that his well-plead allegation” would describe a 
constitutional violation.235  In addition, the court cited two pieces of 
legislation that should have placed Rumsfeld on notice: the Ronald W. 
Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 and 
the Detainee Treatment Act.236  Finally, the court dismissed the 
defendants’ argument that courts have repeatedly “struggled, and 
continue to struggle, with the precise constitutional contours 
applicable to the detention of individuals . . . seized in a foreign war 
zone.”237  The court based this refutation on the argument’s weakness 
in citing “only cases involving procedural due process claims.”238  In 
conclusion, the court of appeals denied Rumsfeld’s qualified immunity 
defense, authorizing the claim to proceed.239 
IV.  PIECING TOGETHER THE OPTIMAL STANDARD 
Though each court engaged in seemingly endless variants of 
analysis, in part to be blamed on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Pearson, a cohesive approach can be derived, enabling courts to test 
qualified immunity in these instances with ease.240  The Pearson case no 
longer requires, but merely encourages, the merit-first method to 
determining qualified immunity.241  For the sake of completeness, this 
Comment’s legal analysis framework will include the fully permitted, 
 
 233  Id. at 607–08.  First, defendants argued plaintiffs provided no “factual context, 
no elaboration, no comparisons” beyond claiming the cell was “extremely cold.”  Id. at 
607.  The court of appeals dismissed the defendants’ argument, stating it was “satisfied” 
with the description.  Id.  Second, defendants attacked the plaintiffs’ complaint for not 
including the issue of whether they asked for a blanket or warm clothing and were 
denied.  Id. at 608.  The court of appeals again stated the specific statement of what 
plaintiffs were given, “a single jumpsuit and a thin plastic mat,” was sufficient.  Id.  The 
court also dismissed defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs did not describe how 
long they were deprived of sleep, only that they were.  Id. 
 234  Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d at 607–08. 
 235  Id. at 609. 
 236  Id. at 610.  
 237  Id. 
 238  Id. The defendant relied on recent Supreme Court cases: Munaf v. Geren, 553 
U.S. 674 (2008); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507 (2004).  Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d at 610. 
 239  Id. at 611. 
 240  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 241  Id. at 236. 
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though not required, test.  It will lay out the optimum analysis derived 
from the cases outlined above.  This test will be formatted to provide a 
framework from which future cases may derive a complete skeleton of 
the test, piecing together the patchwork segments of the lower federal 
courts. 
The test, to be described in more detail below, will consist of three 
questions: (1) Is there a right to be free from the harm alleged, 
whether it is designation, detention, or treatment as an enemy 
combatant?; (2) Was that right clearly established at the time of harm?; 
and (3) Has the plaintiff pled facts sufficient to support a finding that 
the right was violated? 
A.  Is there a right to be free from the harm alleged, whether designation, 
detention, or treatment as an enemy combatant? 
In light of all cases considered, there appears to be a general 
consensus that Americans retain a right to be free from the treatment 
each plaintiff underwent.  Two courts approached this consideration 
by briefly cycling through possible constitutional violations posed by 
the plaintiff in the complaint.  The three rights mentioned include the 
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment, the Sixth Amendment right to access the courts, and the 
Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination.242 
The most persuasive of the rights alleged is that of the Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.  The 
district court’s opinion in Padilla v. Yoo utilized a comparison between 
the rights of enemy combatants and those of prisoners.243  In persuasive 
precedent, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s 
declaration that due process rights of detainees were “at least as great 
as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted 
prisoner” and that the Eighth Amendment also “provide[s] a 
minimum standard of care for determining [detainee] rights.”244  In 
addition, the Supreme Court has reasoned that “[p]ersons who have 
been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate 
treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose 
conditions are designed to punish.”245  The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals (“the Seventh Circuit”) also found that the Eighth 
 
 242  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 243  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
 244  Id. (quoting Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted)). 
 245  Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982)). 
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Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment 
applied to the plaintiffs in Vance v. Rumsfeld.246  The court first waded 
through precedent extending this right, beginning with the Supreme 
Court’s 1979 declaration that “[d]ue process requires that a pretrial 
detainee not be punished.”247  In addition, the Supreme Court issued a 
complementary statement that “[w]here the state seeks to impose 
punishment without [an adjudication of guilt], the pertinent 
constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause.”248  With the final 
point that “we have consistently said” that pretrial detainee 
constitutional protections are “at least as great as the Eighth 
Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner,” the Court 
declared that it “[is] confident that the Framers meant to forbid 
abusive treatment of uncharged and unconvicted detainees where the 
same abusive treatment of a convicted prisoner would be 
prohibited.”249  The court of appeals gave great weight to the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion that “[p]risoners retain the essence of human 
dignity inherent in all persons.  Respect for that dignity animates the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is 
nothing less than the dignity of man.”250  In addition, the court cited 
the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Eighth Amendment 
“embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, 
humanity, and decency . . . against which we must evaluate penal 
measures.”251  In summary, the Eighth Amendment provides ample 
protection to enemy combatants, in light of the general consensus that 
the rights of convicted prisoners establish the floor of Constitutional 
protection for detainees. 
One of the three courts that addressed this issue—the district 
court in Padilla v. Yoo—concluded that the plaintiffs’ Sixth 
Amendment right to access the courts was violated.252  The court 
founded its reasoning in a series of precedent.  To begin the analysis, 
the court equated the rights of convicted prisoners with those of the 
 
 246  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 609 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 
vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 2796 (2013). 
 247  Id. at 607 n.10 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979)). 
 248  Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977)). 
 249  Id. (quoting Washington v. LaPorte Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 306 F.3d 515, 517 (7th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 250  Id. at 608 (quoting Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011)). 
 251  Id. at 609 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). 
 252  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1034–35 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 
748 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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enemy combatants; since convicted prisoners have the constitutional 
right to access the courts, enemy combatants should be afforded an 
equivalent right.253  The prisoner’s “right of access to the courts 
includes contact visitation with his counsel.”254  Then, the court pulled 
from a case holding that an enemy combatant defendant 
“unquestionably has the right to access to counsel in connection with 
the proceedings.”255  The district court in Doe v. Rumsfeld held that the 
right of access to courts was not violated, implying this right should be 
evaluated beside other constitutional claims in this portion of the 
test.256  On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit held there was no right 
of this type.257  In conclusion, the right to access courts qualifies for 
analysis, depending on whether the jurisdiction equates convicted 
prisoner rights with those of enemy combatants. 
Finally, the only court to address the Fifth Amendment right to 
avoid subjection to self-incrimination—the district court in Padilla v. 
Yoo—rejected the argument that this right applied to plaintiffs in these 
cases.258  The court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment is only 
applicable “when the accused is compelled to make a Testimonial 
Communication that is incriminating.”259  It takes more than mere 
compulsive questioning to violate the Self-Incrimination Clause.260  It 
is probable in future cases with like facts that the Fifth Amendment 
Self-Incrimination Clause will not be relevant to analysis of rights 
violated. 
The district court in Doe v. Rumsfeld held that the alleged actions 
violated the Due Process Clause’s “shock the conscience” standard.261  
The Supreme Court has long utilized the shock the conscience 
standard against federal officials to punish acts that offend “basic 
notions of human dignity and a civilized system of justice.”262  The 
Supreme Court has held abuse in “interrogation techniques, either in 
isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular 
 
 253  Id. at 1034 (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996)). 
 254  Id. (quoting Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 255  Id. at 1035 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004)). 
 256  Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 121 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 257  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591 
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
 258  Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 
(1976)). 
 259  Id. (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976)). 
 260  Id. (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003)). 
 261  Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 115. 
 262  Id. (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–74 (1952)). 
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suspect” could violate the Due Process Clause.263  The Court has also 
affirmed the perpetual need to “give protection against torture, 
physical or mental,” through the Due Process Clause.264  In the case of 
Doe v. Rumsfeld, the plaintiff alleged multiple offenses that, taken 
individually, would arguably not shock the conscience.265  The correct 
method of evaluation, however, is to “determine the cumulative impact 
of the conduct alleged.”266  Two theories of liability are raised: intent to 
injure and deliberate indifference.267  In the case of Doe, the conduct 
alleged violated both standards.268  Intent to injure is “most likely to rise 
to the conscience-shocking level,” and the plaintiff sufficiently alleged 
this intent because of Rumsfeld’s extensive role in policy creation.269  
Note that the “mere assertion” of a legitimate government interest in 
detention is not sufficient to “void an otherwise properly pleaded 
constitutional claim.”270  Deliberate indifference, rising between 
negligence and intent to injure, was met, because Doe was in the 
federal government’s custody when he suffered mistreatment.271  The 
only exception to this standard has been found in times of emergency 
to restore order, but this exception does not apply to these cases.272  
The district court in Vance v. Rumsfeld addressed this issue, holding that 
for now the “plaintiffs have set forth the cumulative allegations 
necessary to state a claim of mistreatment.”273  They maintained that 
the determination of whether the conduct violated the shock the 
conscience standard should be evaluated further along in the 
proceeding.274  The determination of whether the conduct alleged 
 
 263  Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)). 
 264  Id. at 115–16 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937)). 
 265  Id. at 116 (“Here Doe alleges, inter alia, that he was detained incommunicado 
and often in solitary confinement.  He also says he was exposed to extreme and 
prolonged cold and continuous light, blindfolded and hooded, subjected to sleep 
alteration and deprivation through exposure to light or blasting music, denied some 
food and water, and physically assaulted . . . . Doe says several ‘psychologically-
disruptive tactics designed to induce compliance’ were used on him throughout his 
detention at Camp Cropper.”). 
 266  Id. 
 267  Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 116. 
 268  Id. at 116–17. 
 269  Id. at 116 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)). 
 270  Id. at 117. 
 271  Id. at 118. 
 272  Id. (citing Cnty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 852–53). 
 273  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591 
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
 274  Id. (“While the evidence may ultimately show that neither the individual 
treatment methods not their cumulative impact ‘shocks the conscience,’ that 
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shocks the conscience grants another avenue for plaintiffs in these 
cases to allege that harm occurred through designation or detention 
as an enemy combatant. 
The courts made further comments striking down various 
defensive arguments.  For example, the Seventh Circuit in Vance v. 
Rumsfeld stated that the setting of the violation, a war zone, made no 
impact on whether an American can claim a constitutional right to be 
free from torture.275  The Ninth Circuit was clear that torture of 
American citizens, including outside the United States border, is 
unconstitutional without doubt.276  Additionally, the district court in 
Doe v. Rumsfeld held that American citizens have the right to remain 
free from confinement that shocks the conscience.277  Jurists 
considering the issue should keep these possible defenses and 
rebuttals in mind when evaluating the next comparable case.  The 
subsequent phase of the inquiry, whether the right to be free from 
harm was clearly established at the time of injury, is the most complex 
consideration of the test. 
B.  Was the right to be free from the harm clearly established at the time of 
the injury? 
The second phase of the test will determine whether there was a 
right to be free of the alleged harm at the time of injury.  This will be 
divided into four considerations: (1) constitutional protections; (2) 
federal authority; (3) case law precedent; and (4) possible collateral 
complications. 
1.  Constitutional Protections 
The right of an American to be free from the treatment detailed 
in each particular case is derived from two arguments.  First, the Eighth 
Amendment right of convicted prisoners corresponds to enemy 
combatants, and second, the Constitution continues to protect 
Americans acting abroad: “The specific designation as an enemy 
combatant does not automatically eviscerate all of the constitutional 
protections afforded to a citizen of the United States.”278 
 
determination is not one we may properly make at this stage of the proceedings.”). 
 275  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 606–07 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013). 
 276  Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 763 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 277  Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 115.  The court later found that this right was both 
clearly established and violated.  Id. 
 278  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
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i.  Enemy combatant constitutional protections mirror 
those of prisoners. 
The complaints detailed in the sample of cases outline treatment 
that would “clearly violate the rights afforded to citizens held in the 
prison context.”279  Though the legal framework for American enemy 
combatants was developing at the time of injury, “federal officials were 
cognizant of the basic fundamental civil rights afforded to detainees 
under the United States Constitution.”280  For example, the Supreme 
Court has held that denial of medical treatment to prisoners violates 
the Constitution.281  Further, the Court has also held that those who 
have not been convicted of a crime and are involuntarily committed 
are “entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of 
confinement than criminals whose conditions are designed to 
punish.”282  The clearly established law concerning the treatment of 
convicted prisoners provides a basis for determining that the law 
against mistreatment of American enemy combatants was clearly 
established at the time of injury. 
The Ninth Circuit raised a counterargument that, since it was not 
clear the plaintiff was “just another detainee,” the notion that 
American enemy combatants were to be afforded the same protections 
as convicted prisoners was not clearly established.283  The difference in 
status is evidenced, according to the court, by the conflicting purposes 
for detaining each type of detainee.284  Criminals are detained to 
achieve “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”285  
On the other hand, President Bush declared in a June 9, 2002 
memorandum to the Secretary of Defense that the purpose of 
detaining the plaintiff, Padilla, was to prevent aid from reaching Al 
Qaeda and to mine Padilla for intelligence.286  The court referenced 
other circuit cases amenable to the idea that constricting access to the 
outside world could be a persuasive purpose for military detention of 
enemy combatants.287  One holding found that detention could be 
necessary to limit the detainee’s access to communication with the 
 
 279  Id.  
 280  Id. at 1037. 
 281  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). 
 282  Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982).  This case is cited both by 
the district court in Padilla v. Yoo and Doe v. Rumsfeld.  Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1035; 
Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 119. 
 283  Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 762 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 284  Id. 
 285  Id. at 762 n.8 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010)). 
 286  Id. 
 287  Id. 
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enemy.288  Another found regulating religious observance could aid the 
government in obtaining control over the detainee for the purposes of 
enhanced interrogation success.289  Though it is tempting to fall into 
this trap of abstraction and technicalities, this argument must fall 
under scrutiny due to the reality of the situation.  Plaintiffs are 
American citizens with the inherent protections of the Constitution 
from the federal government.  A foreign setting or perceived higher 
purpose cannot undermine centuries of clearly established liberties, 
including the right to live free from arbitrary detention and 
maltreatment, which could qualify as torture.  After determining 
whether the detainees should be afforded the Constitutional 
protections of convicted prisoners, the next acknowledgment is that 
American constitutional rights abroad were clearly established at the 
time of injury. 
ii.  American constitutional rights abroad were clearly 
established at the time of injury. 
American citizens’ constitutional right to be free from the injuries 
set forth in the cases above while in foreign countries was clearly 
established at the time of harm.290  The district court in Doe v. Rumsfeld 
dismissed Rumsfeld’s contention that no court had held an American 
citizen possesses constitutional rights on a foreign battlefield when 
detained by the American military.291  Precedent enforced the concept 
that American citizens act abroad with the protection of the 
Constitution and that “the shield which the Bill of Rights and other 
parts of the Constitution provide to protect [a citizen’s] life and liberty 
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another 
land.”292  The district court also took the time to distinguish a recent 
D.C. Circuit case holding the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment 
applied to aliens detained in Afghanistan and Iraq was not clearly 
established around the time of this violation, 2004.293  The court 
distinguished the circumstances because the plaintiff was an alien, 
whereas Doe was an American citizen: “Clearly, a plaintiff’s citizenship 
 
 288  Id. (citing Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 395 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
 289  Yoo, 678 F.3d at 762 n.8 (citing Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 805 
(D.S.C. 2011)). 
 290  See Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 119 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 
(D.C. Cir. 2012); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 969–70 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 
653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 
F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 291  Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 120. 
 292  Id. at 119 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957)). 
 293  Id. at 120–21 (citing Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
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often goes a long way in determining the scope of available 
constitutional protections.”294 
Similarly, the district court in Vance v. Rumsfeld began with 
reference to a case facing the question of whether the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments apply to American citizens detained in foreign war 
zones: “[T]he Fourth and Fifth Amendments certainly protect U.S. 
citizens detained in the course of hostilities in Iraq.”295  The court was 
also moved by the “oft-cited” Supreme Court plurality opinion of Reid 
v. Covert: 
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.  
Its power and authority have no other source.  It can only act 
in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution.  When the Government reaches out to punish 
a citizen abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other 
parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and 
liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens 
to be in another land.296 
In addition, the Second Circuit has stated “[t]hat the Bill of Rights has 
extraterritorial application to the conduct of federal agents directed at 
United States citizens is well settled.”297  The court found recent D.C. 
Circuit cases involving aliens bringing suit for abuse while detained to 
be the most persuasive.298  Though the court granted qualified 
immunity to the defendants in both instances, the decision to do so 
rested in great part on the nationality of the plaintiffs.299  In In re Iraq, 
the “plaintiffs’ non-citizenship was the primary factor” in holding for 
the defendants.300  Similarly, in Rasul v. Myers, the D.C. Circuit not only 
“relied on plaintiffs’ non-citizenship,” but also “reaffirmed that 
American citizens are in fact entitled to such protections.”301 
 
 
 294  Id. at 121 (quoting Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2010), 
aff’d, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), and 
rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 295  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591 
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), and rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 
(7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kar v. Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80, 83 (D.D.C. 2008)). 
 296  Id. (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (plurality opinion)). 
 297  Id. (quoting United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
 298  Id. 
 299  Id. at 970. 
 300  Id. (citing In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 108–
09 (D.D.C. 2007)). 
 301  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591 
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), and rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 
(7th Cir. 2012) (citing Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 530–32 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
PERDUE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2015  5:45 PM 
248 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:215 
The district court in Vance v. Rumsfeld held that the treatment of 
plaintiffs was especially reprehensible, because the decision to 
perpetuate the treatment was not made during any emergency 
requiring “split-second” decision-making.302  This argument derives 
from a Supreme Court statement that behavior is particularly shocking 
when the decision-maker has had “time to make unhurried judgments, 
upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by the 
pulls of competing obligations.”303  The “tumultuous foreign setting” of 
the location did not counter the clearly established constitutional 
rights of American citizens abroad.304 
Finally, the shock the conscience standard that the Supreme 
Court imposed on federal officials through the Due Process Clause was 
clearly established at the time of injury.305  The cases “declaring 
unconstitutional conduct or conditions of confinement that shock the 
conscience” span nearly a century and grant notice to representatives 
of the federal government that interrogation techniques represent 
ground for liability.306 
There are many possible avenues to conclude the constitutional 
protection of American citizens was clearly established at the time of 
harm.  Beyond constitutional protections are federal statutory 
safeguards that are in place for American citizens and useful in 
evaluating whether the right to be free from the harm alleged was 
clearly established. 
2.  Federal Authority 
Statutory grounds for maintaining the right of American plaintiffs 
to remain free from the detention and mistreatment described above 
were clearly established at the time of harm and fall within both the 
National Defense Authorization Act and the Detainee Treatment Act.  
The Seventh Circuit in Vance v. Rumsfeld supported this position.307  The 
court specifically referenced the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 10 U.S.C. § 801, stat. note § 
 
 302  Id. at 971 (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998)). 
 303  Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998). 
 304  Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 971. 
 305  Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 115 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 
(D.C. Cir. 2012); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 
653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 
F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 306  Id. at 120. 
 307  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 610 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated (2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 2796 (2013). 
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1092, which affirms that U.S. military interrogation techniques are 
prohibited from violating the Constitution.308  The Act also directs the 
Secretary of Defense to ensure military practices are “consistent with 
international obligations and laws of the United States.”309  The 
Detainee Treatment Act, specifically 10 U.S.C. § 801, stat. note § 1002, 
explicitly limits authorized techniques to those expressly named in the 
Army Field Manual, a guide which did not contain authorization for 
the coercive techniques used on the plaintiffs.310  These additional 
resources provide further grounds to prove the defendants named in 
the cases named above operated under the knowledge that their 
behavior was clearly established to be illegal. 
The district court raised an opposing argument in Lebron v. 
Rumsfeld.311  The court utilized the conflicting opinions in the branches 
of the federal government on the legality of the treatment of the 
plaintiff as grounds for proving that the illegality of the actions was not 
clearly established at the time of injury.312  On one hand, the Office of 
Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice “officially sanctioned” the 
coercive techniques used against the plaintiff, concluding that they 
were lawful.313  Additionally, the Department of Defense Working 
Group on detainee interrogations issued a lengthy report concluding 
that the interrogation techniques were lawful.314  On the other hand, 
both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the General Counsel of 
the Navy “vigorously challenged” these contentions, maintaining that 
the techniques violated both American and international law.315 
Although the court proposed that this variance in opinion within the 
executive branch served to clearly establish that this area is “the very 
definition of unsettled law,” this logic is unpersuasive.316  Surely the 
legal opinions of agencies and the executive branch staff are 
persuasive, but to require unanimity among the politicized legal minds 
before a concept can be clearly established would foreclose all 
qualified immunity analysis.  The court defended its hazy reasoning by 
following the pattern of other courts that have “also shown a marked 
reluctance to deny qualified immunity to officials in circumstances 
where they were required to balance competing interests of the citizen 
 
 308  Id. 
 309  Id. 
 310  Id. 
 311  Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 803 (D.S.C. 2011). 
 312  Id.  
 313  Id. 
 314  Id. 
 315  Id. 
 316  Id. 
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and the government.”317  The reluctance stems from the complaint that 
the required balancing is “subtle, difficult to apply and not yet well 
defined.”318  It is little wonder that the standard continues to lack 
definition, considering the mass grants of qualified immunity.  
Continued avoidance of tackling the controversy, the merits of each 
case, and of developing the standard to be applied will only perpetuate 
the lack of guidance granted to lower courts.  In addition to federal 
statutory authority grants of notice, judicial precedent affords further 
means of concluding that the rights of American citizens were clearly 
established at the time of injury. 
3.  Case Law Precedent 
The case law utilized to hammer out arguments in these cases only 
serves to make a complex maze less maneuverable.  The most cohesive 
manner by which to organize the information is to divide it into two 
sections: (1) a brief analysis of the three most discussed cases and (2) 
a discussion of whether extensive precedent is even necessary to claim 
that there is clearly established law on this point. 
i.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Ex parte Quirin, and Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd 
Though entire law review articles could be written solely on these 
cases, this Comment would be remiss in not highlighting their 
structural positions in the legal-analytical framework, as they make 
appearances in many of the sample cases. 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld is referenced in Padilla v. Yoo at both the district 
court and appellate levels.319  Hamdi, a 2004 Supreme Court case, held 
that a detained enemy combatant maintained a fundamental “right to 
be free from involuntary confinement by his own government without 
the due process of law.”320  This right included the right to access 
counsel, notice as to the charges against him, and a fair opportunity to 
be heard.321  The case was decided in 2004, which was too late to grant 
notice to any of the case samples, and thus proved  insufficient grounds 
 
 317  Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 801 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540 
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012). 
 318  Id. (quoting DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
 319  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 
(9th Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 761 (9th Cir. 2012); see Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 320  Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 531. 
 321  Id. at 533, 539.  This case was not included in my case sample even though the 
plaintiff was an American detained as an enemy combatant because the court did not 
address the qualified immunity question. 
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to find that the right to be free from mistreatment was clearly 
established.322  Additionally, the court of appeals in Vance v. Rumsfeld 
discounted the defendant’s reliance on Hamdi to demonstrate the 
“struggle” with defining “the precise constitutional contours 
applicable to the detention of individuals—citizen and non-citizen 
alike—seized in a foreign war zone.”323  The court dismissed the 
importance of Hamdi on two grounds.324  First, the case is one involving 
procedural due process, which is not relevant to the discussion.325  
Second, the case sheds “no useful light on how a reasonable federal 
official might have thought that the Constitution permitted him to 
torture, or to authorize the torture of, a civilian U.S. citizen.”326 
Similarly, Ex parte Quirin, a Supreme Court case from 1942, 
involved German agents claiming to be American citizens maintaining 
a right to trial by jury when detained as unlawful belligerents.327  
Citizenship was “immaterial,” and “as an unlawful combatant he was 
subject to trial by military tribunal alongside the alien saboteurs.”328  
The court of appeals in Padilla v. Yoo found that Ex parte Quirin 
suggested to defendants that enemy combatants are afforded less 
rights than prisoners.329  Disregarding the year in which the German 
agents were detained as a time of patriotic fervor, the case is 
distinguishable from the sample cases above.  The court never 
determined whether the agent was an American citizen or not, and the 
plaintiff was not subjected to maltreatment that could be described as 
torture.  Though Ex parte Quirin is valuable to acknowledge, it has no 
significant part to play in this analysis. 
Finally, the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd granted qualified 
immunity to a former Attorney General after the alleged improper 
detention of the plaintiff.330  The defendant authorized detention of 
multiple suspects, claiming the purpose of detention was to use the 
detainees as witnesses in a criminal trial.331  The plaintiff alleged that 
 
 322  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1037 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 
748 (9th Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 761 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 323  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 610 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013). 
 324  Id. 
 325  Id.  
 326  Id. 
 327  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), modified sub nom. U.S. ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 
63 S. Ct. 22 (1942). 
 328  Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 758–59 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 329  Id. 
 330  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011). 
 331  Id. at 2077. 
PERDUE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2015  5:45 PM 
252 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:215 
the authorization was intended to detain suspected terrorists against 
whom the federal government lacked sufficient evidence to charge 
with a crime.332  The court of appeals in Padilla v. Yoo argued that the 
Supreme Court’s grant of qualified immunity to the defendant 
affirmed that there was no clearly established right at the time of the 
alleged violations to be free from injury.333  This argument is not 
convincing.  The scope of the Ashcroft holding is quite narrow.  First, 
the Court did not address claims that the Eighth Amendment 
violations were clearly established, because the plaintiff was not 
subjected to brutal treatment as were the plaintiffs here.  The clearly 
established analysis was limited to Fourth Amendment violations.334  
Second, the holding is narrowly confined to material-witness warrants: 
“At the time of al-Kidd’s arrest, not a single judicial opinion had held 
that pretext could render an objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to 
a material-witness unconstitutional.”335  Though deceptively 
precedential at first glance, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd cannot be relied on as a 
means to find that American citizens do not have a clearly established 
right to be free from maltreatment upon detention as an enemy 
combatant. 
The relevant judicial precedent above warrants consideration, but 
ultimately it sheds no affirmative light on the issue at bar: whether the 
right of American citizens to be free from mistreatment was clearly 
established at the time of injury.  This has little impact on the 
cumulative analysis, considering it is likely that judicial precedent is 
not required in these cases. 
ii.  Necessity of Judicial Precedent 
Several courts relied on the argument that no court, in addressing 
the issue of qualified immunity, has specifically discussed the right of 
Americans to be free from maltreatment when designated as enemy 
combatants.336  Given the nature of the violations alleged in these cases, 
however, “[t]his is not a case where the precise violation must have 
been previously held unlawful.”337  As the Seventh Circuit stated so 
 
 332  Id. at 2079. 
 333  Yoo, 678 F.3d at 758–59. 
 334  Id. 
 335  al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 336  Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 803 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540 
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012); see Yoo, 678 F.3d at 761 (“[I]t 
remains murky whether an enemy combatant detainee may be subjected to conditions 
of confinement and methods of interrogation that would be unconstitutional if 
applied in the ordinary prison and criminal settings.”).  
 337  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 610 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 
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eloquently, “[w]here the constitutional violation is patently obvious 
and the contours of the right sufficiently clear, a controlling case on 
point is not needed to defeat a defense of qualified immunity.”338  A 
comparable Seventh Circuit case requiring no direct precedent denied 
qualified immunity to officials who chained a prisoner for seven hours 
to a post in the sun.339  Particularly compelling is the Ninth Circuit’s 
Hydrick v. Hunter, addressing the lack of clearly established precedent 
concerning psychiatric hospital conditions of confinement for sexual 
offenders.340  The court held that though the law in the area was “still 
evolving,” the rights “afforded [convicted] prisoners set a floor for 
those that must be afforded [sexually violent predators].”341  Because 
of the nature of the offenses, ranging from violence to squalid 
conditions, “surely it is clear that certain actions . . . transgress the 
boundary” between legal and illegal, regardless of specific judicial 
precedent.342  The district court in Doe v. Rumsfeld similarly dismissed 
the need to find identical precedent, as “the Court need not require 
previous declarations that the constitutional right existed in identical 
factual circumstances.”343  Additionally, the district court in Vance v. 
Rumsfeld acknowledged how important it is “that we not shirk from 
protecting against clear constitutional violations simply because the 
clear general right has not previously been enforced in the precise 
circumstances facing the court.”344  The Supreme Court has similarly 
claimed that “[t]here has never been . . . a section 1983 case accusing 
welfare officials of selling foster children into slavery; it does not follow 
that if such a case arose, the officials would be immune from damages 
or liability.”345  The principles apply easily to the situation at hand.  In 
these cases, American citizens were detained by officials of the federal 
government and subjected to brutal treatment.  The federal 
 
opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013). 
 338  Id. 
 339  Id. (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). 
 340  Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, Hunter v Hydrick, 566 
U.S. 1256 (2009), remanded to 669 F.3d 937. 
 341  Id. at 989. 
 342  Id. at 990 n.8. 
 343  Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 120 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Where preexisting law would dictate to a reasonable official that his 
conduct is unconstitutional, even if prior case law has not explicitly addressed identical 
circumstances, the unconstitutionality of that conduct may be found clearly 
established.”). 
 344  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 970 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591 
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th 
Cir. 2012).  
 345  United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (internal citations omitted). 
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government has been on notice since the country’s inception that the 
nation belongs to its citizens and is not to be used as a cruel hand of 
oppression by the trusted elected officials.  A final consideration 
remains: what is the impact of the tumultuous state of “torture” in 
national and international law? 
4.  Collateral Complication: The Definition of Torture 
One objection to finding that American citizens have the right to 
be free from the treatment described in the sample cases is that the 
definition of “torture” has been muddied and pulled between 
competing political interests.  This Comment contends, however, that 
even without the title of “torture” to describe the alleged conduct, the 
legal foundation prohibiting such conduct was clearly established at 
the time.  It offers a brief summary of the issues to provide the reader 
with a well-rounded concept of the facets of the legal-analytical 
framework provided. 
Although it was clear from 2001 to 2003 that torture referred to 
“intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental,” it was unclear what constituted severe pain and suffering.346  
The following sources of information were available at the time of the 
dates in question.  First, the Eighth Amendment has historically 
protected American citizens from the infliction of “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”347  In 2002, the State Department issued a statement 
confirming that “[t]orture is prohibited by law throughout the United 
States.”348  In addition, it encouraged that “[n]o official of the 
Government, federal, state or local, civilian or military, is authorized 
to commit or to instruct anyone else to commit torture.”349  There are 
“[n]o exceptional circumstances [that] may be invoked as a 
justification of torture.”350  An international agreement that the United 
States signed in 1988, the Convention against Torture, defined torture 
as “[a]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person, information or a confession, 
punishing him . . . or intimidating or coercing him . . . .”351  In addition, 
by 1994, a federal statute criminalizing torture abroad defined torture 
 
 346  Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 764 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 347  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 348  Yoo, 678 F.3d at 763 n.10. 
 349  Id. 
 350  Id. 
 351  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, art. 1.1, Apr. 18, 1988, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027. 
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as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law 
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) 
upon another person within his custody or physical control.”352  The 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 defined torture as “any act, 
directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical 
control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering 
arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted . . . .”353  All of 
these sources were readily available to American lawmakers from 2001 
to 2003. 
In addition to American sources, other countries had legislation 
illuminating the meaning of “torture” for reference from 2001 to 
2003.354  The European Court of Human Rights’ leading decision on 
torture held that wall standing, subjection to noise, hooding, 
deprivation of drink and food, and deprivation of sleep did not 
constitute torture: “they did not occasion suffering of the particular 
intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood.”355  
The Israeli Supreme Court, however, found sleep deprivation, stress 
positions, hooding, violent shaking, and exposure to loud music to be 
against their law.356  These two cases demonstrate the two foremost 
international sources of debate on the definition. 
At the time of the defendant’s actions, there was also precedent 
in the Ninth Circuit in which defendants were found guilty of 
“torture.”357  In a 2001 suit under the Convention against Torture, the 
plaintiff was severely beaten for a month while interrogated.358  On one 
occasion, the plaintiff was tied, blindfolded, and burned with cigarettes 
for over one week.359  In a 1996 suit under the Alien Tort Statute, 
torture of the plaintiff was found when he was blindfolded, beaten, 
threatened with electric shock, threatened with death, denied sleep, 
subject to waterboarding, and imprisoned in an unlit and hot cell for 
 
 352  18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2004).   
 353  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102–256, § 3(b), 106 Stat. 73 
(1991) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991)). 
 354  Yoo, 678 F.3d at 764–65. 
 355  Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 59, 80 (1978). 
 356  HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel 53(4) PD 817, 
1482–85 [1999] (Isr.), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471. 
 357  Padilla v. Yoo 678 F.3d 748, 766 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 358  Al-Saher v. I.N.S., 268 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by, 355 F.3d 1140 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
 359  Id. 
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seven months.360  These examples demonstrate sources of American 
judicial precedent discussing the definition of torture, thus granting 
elucidation to the contested word. 
Once it is decided that the rights of Step One were clearly 
established at the time of harm, the final determination in Step Two is 
whether the alleged facts of the complaint are sufficient to support a 
claim in federal court. 
C.  Did the plaintiffs plead factual allegations sufficient to support a 
claim that the clearly established right was violated? 
The final portion of analysis is broken into two possible 
considerations: causation and violation.  Though some court analyses 
grouped causation analysis with the preceding Bivens evaluation, this 
Comment includes causation here as a means to prove violation, 
separating the two into categories simply for the sake of organization. 
1.  Causation 
Federal officials are liable for the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of their conduct when they have “crafted the policies for 
or authorized facially unconstitutional action.”361  Causation analysis is 
broken into two parts: procedural due process and substantive due 
process.362  The procedural due process hurdle is quite high in light of 
the facts of the cases, requiring evidence that defendants either 
“personally authorized” the acts or were “deliberately indifferent” to 
the treatment of plaintiffs.363  In the case of Doe v. Rumsfeld, it was not 
enough that Rumsfeld had final say over whether to continue 
detention of plaintiffs and the ability to reform the Camp’s 
procedures.364  Plaintiffs were required to plead facts to allege with 
particularity that Rumsfeld controlled the procedural rights of the 
detainees.365  The district court in Vance v. Rumsfeld also held in favor 
of the defendant as far as the procedural due process claim went, 
holding that the facts alleged did not “go beyond a speculative level.”366  
Though procedural due process claims face little hope of survival, 
 
 360  Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 790–91 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 361  Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 113 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 362  Id. at 113–14. 
 363  Id. at 114.  
 364  Id. at 114–15. 
 365  Id. 
 366  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591 
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th 
Cir. 2012).  
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substantive due process analysis is more forgiving to plaintiffs. 
Substantive due process claims in the sample cases face greater 
success than the procedural due process claims.  Case law on 
substantive due process supports the argument that those who give 
orders are personally liable for the effects of the conduct ordered.367  
Precedent includes a case in which plaintiffs enjoyed success after 
suing the head of the Department for Child and Family Services for 
creating policy that violated their constitutional rights.368  Substantive 
due process does not require direct causation, only that the defendant 
set in motion acts she or he knows or should know will cause the 
harm.369  For example, an assistant city attorney was found liable after 
drafting a letter denying a permit for a parade.370  Liability was imposed 
despite the fact that senior city officials revised the letter and others 
approved and signed the denial.371  The court found causation between 
the defendant’s actions and the denial of constitutional rights, because 
there were not enough intervening factors.372  The reasoning was 
grounded in the claim that the defendant’s written opinion was a 
“substantial factor” in the overall denial of the permit.373  Of further 
note is a case involving two Department of Homeland Security 
attorneys, held liable for advising customs agents that they could refuse 
to release confiscated property.374  The reasoning was grounded in the 
argument that the unconstitutional seizures were foreseeable as a 
result of the advice.375  Judicial precedent has successfully applied the 
principle that those who order the denial of constitutional rights could 
be held liable for the actions of their subordinates. 
The causation between the defendants and the harm that served 
as the basis for the substantive due process claim is widely accepted as 
an element to be proven in the case samples through sufficient facts to 
show that defendants “knew of, ordered, and approved the alleged 
constitutionally deficient interrogation methods and detention 
 
 367  Id. at 962. 
 368  Id. (citing Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 614–15 (7th Cir. 
2002)); see also Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 369  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1032–33 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 
748 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 370  Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1220 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 371  Id. 
 372  Id. 
 373  Id. 
 374  Anoushiravani v. Fishel, No. CV 04-212-MO, 2004 WL 1630240, at *5 (D. Or. 
July 19, 2004). 
 375  Id. 
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conditions.”376  The factors supporting this view in Doe v. Rumsfeld 
include defendant’s personal approval of enhanced interrogation 
techniques, the deployment of Major General Miller to “gitmo-ize” the 
Camp, and memorandums and groups created for the purpose of 
evaluating enhanced interrogation techniques.377  Nearly identical 
considerations influenced both the court of appeals and district court 
in Vance v. Rumsfeld to hold that there were sufficient facts alleged to 
support the claim that Rumsfeld was “personally involved in the 
unconstitutional treatment.”378  The district court in Padilla v. Yoo 
similarly found that the defendant, Yoo, caused the violation of the 
plaintiff’s rights.379  Relevant facts indicating foreseeable injury 
included Yoo’s participation in the development of policy, his work 
laying the legal framework for the designation of enemy combatants, 
his personal review of the plaintiff’s file, and his legal advice that 
federal officials could detain Americans because the Fourth 
Amendment would not apply.380 
In utilizing relevant analysis to establish that there was causation 
between defendant’s actions and the harm suffered by plaintiffs, the 
foundation of the legal-analytical framework determining that there 
was a violation of rights is concluded.  Causation in conjunction with a 
defendant’s proven violation of rights signifies that a plaintiff has 
pleaded with enough particularity to support a claim. 
2.  Violation 
This final step is much more forgiving to the plaintiff than those 
discussed above.  This stage simply requires a closer look into the facts 
alleged in the complaint to determine whether they are sufficiently 
particularized to support a holding that the defendant’s actions 
violated the clearly established right.  In the case of Padilla v. Yoo in the 
district court, the treatment alleged was deemed to violate the Eighth 
Amendment and the right of access to the courts.381  The persuasive 
 
 376  Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 114 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 377  Id. at 113–14. 
 378  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 603–05 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2010), 
aff’d, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 
701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 379  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 
(9th Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 761 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 380  Id. at 1033–34. 
 381  Id. at 1034–35. 
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allegations in the complaint included shackling, loud noises at all 
hours, psychological stress, and impermissible denial of medical 
care.382  The district court in Doe v. Rumsfeld held that “Doe has pleaded 
factual allegations sufficient to support a claim that Rumsfeld’s 
conduct violated [the] clearly-established right” to be free from actions 
that shock the conscience.383  This is evidenced by the claims of extreme 
exposure to cold and light, being hooded, and the deprivation of 
sleep, water, and food.384  The court of appeals in Vance v. Rumsfeld 
made it clear that an argument that the treatment did not violate a 
constitutional right “would be futile.”385  Additionally, it held that the 
defendant’s claims that the complaint was vague were “not persuasive,” 
reasoning that phrases such as “extreme cold” were specific enough to 
meet the pleading requirements.386  The district court in Vance v. 
Rumsfeld found that the description of the complaint merited an 
assumption that the “conditions of confinement were torturous,” a 
violation of the shock the conscience standard.387  The cases not 
mentioned either did not reach this stage of analysis because of a 
finding that the right to be free from the treatment was not clearly 
established or were decided solely on the grounds of Bivens.  If a 
defendant is found to have violated a clearly established right, the 
claim may proceed, and the court must grapple with the merits of the 
plaintiff’s case. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has held that a “state of war is not a blank 
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s 
citizens.”388  When an American citizen has not been charged, held 
captive by the federal government, and subjected to treatment 
reserved for detainees in Guantanamo Bay, it is the duty of the 
opposing branches of government to take a stand on the nation’s 
behalf.  When the judiciary, the ultimate symbol of justice and equity, 
 
 382  Id. at 1035. 
 383  Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 115 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 384  Id. at 116. 
 385  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 607 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013). 
 386  Id. at 607–08. 
 387  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591 
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
 388  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004). 
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bows its hallowed head in deference to the executive branch, the 
country has suffered a loss.  The interplay between the American 
citizen’s constitutional rights and the executive’s right to protect the 
nation from danger is meant to be a balance, not a perpetually tilted 
scale. 
The remedy is grounded in the country’s legislative and judicial 
branches.  The legislature, “fully aware of the body of litigation arising 
out of the detention of persons following September 11, 2001, has not 
seen fit to fashion a statutory cause of action to provide for a remedy 
of money damages under these circumstances.”389  In addition, every 
final decision stemming from the four cases resulted in the haphazard 
grant of qualified immunity, usually as a side note to Bivens analysis.  
With the legislative and judicial branches balking at the opportunity to 
provide answers to the country concerning the horrendous allegations, 
the executive’s blank check has effectively been written. 
This nation deserves, after over a decade of war and scandal, to 
lay claim to a clear, fair, and just legal-analytical framework for these 
claims.  The standard set forth above, thorough and an attempt at 
clarity, sews together the scattershot arguments, complaints, and 
analyses littered through thirteen different opinions.  Remember that 
denying qualified immunity to the defendant is not equivalent to 
holding in favor of the plaintiff.  This is just the first step in permitting 
the parties to obtain evidence through discovery and litigate the merits 
of their cases before a judge, a right guaranteed by the Constitution.  
Designation as an enemy combatant “does not automatically eviscerate 
all of the constitutional protections afforded to a citizen of the United 
States,” and defendants’ shield of qualified immunity should not deter 
courts from detailed and thorough analysis.390 
 
 
 389  Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 799 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540 
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012). 
 390  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
